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PREFACE
This study on Advanced Missions Safety has been performed as Task 2. 6 of
Contract NASw-2301, entitled "Advanced Space Program Analysis and Plan-
ning. " The task consisted of three subtasks.
Subtask 1 —
Subtask 2 —
Subtask 3 -
Space Shuttle Rescue Capability
Experiment Safety
Emergency Crew Transfer
Each subtask is an entity not related to or dependent upon any activity under
either of the other two subtasks.
The results of Task 2. 6 are presented in three volumes.
Volume I: Executive Summary Report presents a brief, con-
cise review of results and summarizes the princi-
pal conclusions and recommendations for all three
subtasks.
Volume II: Technical Discussion is in three parts, each pro-
viding a comprehensive discussion of a single
subtask.
Part 1 provides an assessment of Earth Orbit
Shuttle (EOS) capability to perform a rescue mis-
sion. It treats several concepts for augmenting
this capability and increasing EOS rescue mission
utility.
Part 2 presents an analysis of potential hazards
introduced when experimental equipment is car-
ried aboard the EOS. It identifies safety guide-
lines and requirements for eliminating or reducing
these hazards.
Part 3 discusses the applicability and utility of
various means of emergency crew transfer between
a disabled and a rescuing vehicle.
Volume III; Appendices is in two parts, each devoted to an
individual subtask. Part 1 contains detailed sup-
porting analysis and backup material for Subtask 1,
and Part 2 contains similar material for Subtask 2.
Volume III is of interest primarily to the technical
specialist.
Since the reader is not necessarily interested in all three subtasks, each part
of Volumes II and III is a separate document.
All calculations were made using the customary system of units, and the data
are presented on that basis. Values in the International System of Units (SI)
are also given. Data taken from reference sources are presented in the sys-
tem of units employed in the original reference.
The Advanced Missions Safety Task was sponsored by NASA Headquarters
and managed by the Advanced Missions Office of the Office of Manned Space
Flight. Mr. Herbert Schaefer, the study monitor, provided guidance and
counsel that significantly aided the effort. Mr. Charles W. Childs of the
Safety Office, NASA Headquarters, and Miss Ruth Weltmann of the Aerospace
Safety Research and Data Institute, NASA-Lewis, also provided valuable con-
tributions by reviewing results of the Experiment Safety Study and making
positive suggestions for improving visibility of the results.
SUMMARY OVERVIEW
In contrast to safety considerations in experiment ground facilities, which
emphasize experimenter safety first, an experiment laboratory in space has
to give prime safety considerations to the operational functioning of the
Orbiter to enable a safe crew return.
In ground facilities, hazardous experiments are separated from other experi-
ments and personnel. For space operations, experiment equipment of a
hazardous nature may be densely packed, because flight costs are high. For
this reason, special attention has to be given to potential interferences and
interactions such as overheating, permeating fields, spurious signals, high
voltage potential, etc. Such interaction between experiments could lead to a
malfunction of otherwise safe equipment and might influence the safe operation
of the Orbiter.
Many hazardous materials on board the Orbiter, such as cryogenics, storable
propellants, etc. , will add to the hazards of some of the experiments and the
crew. The location of such materials in relation to any experiment or Orbiter
equipment, as well as the access and egress routes for the experimenters,
require serious consideration.
In contrast to most ground laboratories, the Orbiter structure outside the
crew compartment can withstand a pressure difference of only a few psi.
Therefore, experiments with components of a potential high pressure or
explosive source have to be constrained, shielded, or safed to prevent
inadvertent activation by other experiments.
Toxic and hazardous materials (especially in gaseous or powder form), which
present a health hazard to men or which can damage materials or equipment,
may have to be double-contained with special environmental conditioning
systems, as complete cleanup of contaminants in zero gravity might be
impossible to achieve.
Venting of effluents into space, even in small amounts, will create a thrust
that has to be counteracted if the Experiment Module or the Orbiter are to
remain in a given orbit and to be prevented from tumbling. Thus, effluent
outlets should be designed and located so that any undesired thrust is com-
pensated by a counteracting thrust. If this cannot be achieved in an emergency,
sufficient Orbiter thrust should be available to keep the Orbiter on course,
even if all effluent has to be vented by emergency relief in one direction.
Similar considerations apply also to the case of rotating equipment producing
reaction torques.
Many of the experiments being considered for shirtsleeve operation will
require venting of one or more fluids because the experiments are conducted
in an artificial environment that has to be maintained for crew life support.
Different fluid lines require prominent marking, ready accessibility for repair,
and arrangement to permit convenient access or egress. All fluid lines require
markings and connectors that are unique to any one fluid.
Many of the experiments being considered have high voltage components with
the potential of fire, shock, etc. which could result in injury to the crew and
damage to the Orbiter. The clear indication of the operational status of such
components is required. In case of emergency, provisions for automatic
shutdown and rapid discharge after shutdown are required. Ground circuits
should be avoided.
Emergency situations resulting from experiment equipment and/or its
operation that could lead to Orbiter damage and/or loss require immediate
assessment by the Orbiter crew. This can be accomplished by providing
warning signals in the crew compartment which indicate the hazard, severity,
location, etc. Normal procedures provide the commander with the authority
to determine actions necessary to save the Orbiter and crew. This may
involve sacrificing an experiment, an Experiment Module, and perhaps even
a crew member, if the emergency warrants such drastic means and the
Orbiter and most of the crew can be saved by such an action.
Radiation sources, such as radioisotopes, X-rays, lasers, etc. which can
cause injury to men and damage to materials, equipment, experiments, and
the operation of the Orbiter, should be clearly marked, monitored, shielded,
and located so that no interference is possible under normal operating
conditions. Emergency procedures and plans should be prepared and
executed, if an emergency or malfunction is indicated by the monitoring
system.
In ground facilities, the safety plan for any complex experiment usually iden-
tifies start-up, operating, and normal and emergency shutdown procedures.
For the case of an Orbiter, where a number of experiments might be operated
simultaneously, safety procedures should consider not only single experi-
ments but also the interactions of all experiments to be operated at any one
time. A certain shutdown procedure might be safe for one experiment but
might create an emergency situation in another experiment, thus endangering
the Orbiter and crew. Such procedures might indicate, for example, that
if an emergency occurs in experiment A, experiment B has to be shutdown
prior to taking action on experiment A. In another situation, the Orbiter may
be required to make a certain maneuver before shutdown action can be taken
on either experiment, in order to ensure the safety of the Orbiter.
In the case of hazardous experiment equipment such as lasers and X-rays,
there should be a trade-off study made to determine whether the experiment
should be conducted within or exterior to the Experiment Module or Orbiter.
If located within the Experiment Module, the experimenter can closely super-
vise the experiment operations and assure compliance with all safety pro-
cedures. If located exterior to the Module or Orbiter, docking or EVA may
be required. Such operations also have safety implications, such as collisions
and EVA hazards.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. BACKGROUND
A major NASA objective is to utilize manned space flight capability for the
benefit of our nation and mankind. To further this objective, a number of
experiment programs have been defined. These experiments are described
in the "Reference Earth Orbital Research and Applications Investigations"
(Blue Book), Ref. 1. This broad-based experiment program definition
encompasses the disciplines of astronomy, physics, earth observations,
communications/navigation, materials science and manufacturing, tech-
nology, and the life sciences.
Present plans place complete dependence on the Space Shuttle for trans-
porting such scientific and application payloads into space and returning them
(where appropriate) from earth orbit. Additionally, the Orbiter element of
the Shuttle is required to deploy and retrieve payloads in some instances; in
other cases, the Orbiter functions as a primary base of operations for an
attached experimental payload. In all cases, the nature of the experiment
payloads and their potential for introducing or precipitating hazards which
endanger the safety of experimenters and/or the Orbiter and its crew are of
obvious interest. Therefore, this study was undertaken to investigate the
safety aspects of in-space experiments performed in connection with the
Space Shuttle.
1.2 STUDY OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the study were:
a. Analyze the potential emergency situations created by carrying
experiment equipment aboard a Space Shuttle.
b. Identify safety guidelines and requirements for eliminating or
reducing hazards to the Space Shuttle and its crew which may be
introduced by the experiment equipment and its operations.
17
1.3 STUDY SCOPE
The safety analysis considered all mission phases from the launch pad through
to deployment, free flight (where applicable), experiment operations, retrieval,
and final disposition. Also considered were the interactions of the experiment
equipment and experiment operations with Experiment Modules (Pallet, MSM,
RAM, Sortie Module, etc.) and the Space Shuttle, other payloads within the
Orbiter cargo bay, and associated satellites.
18
2. PRIMARY PARAMETERS AFFECTING EXPERIMENT SAFETY
The parameters affecting safety during experiment activities conducted on
or near the Space Shuttle Orbiter are functions of:
a. The nature and operation of the Experiment
b. The experiment and support equipment
c. The accommodation mode of the Experiment Equipment
within the Shuttle Orbiter
The following sections briefly discuss significant aspects of these Shuttle/
Experiment interactions and give a summary of some of the primary param-
eters affecting experiment safety.
A detailed treatment of Experiment Equipment, support requirements, experi-
ment operations, and hazards analyses is presented in Vol. Ill, Part 2.
2. 1 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS
This safety effort is based on Experiments and Experiment Equipment identi-
fied as Space Shuttle payloads in the "Blue Book" (Ref. 1) and the SOAR
study (Ref. 2).
Seven scientific disciplines with related first level functional program ele-
ments (FPEs) are identified in the "Blue Book." Experiment categories of
these disciplines are shown in Table 2-1. Specific Experiment Equipment,
support equipment, and materials used for performing the Experiments are
discussed in Vol. Ill, Part 2.
Several operational modes of Experiment Modules will be involved. These
include a module attached to a Space Station or a Space Shuttle Orbiter
(Shuttle-Sortie mission mode) or a free-flying module. Figure 2-1 shows a
schematic of various Experiment Modules in deployed configuration.
19
Table 2-1. Blue Book FPE Experiment Categories
Astronomy
X-Ray Astronomy (A- l )
• Advanced Stellar Astronomy (A-2)
Advanced Solar Astronomy (A-3)
Intermediate Size UV Telescopes (A-4)
High Energy Stellar Astronomy (A-5)
IR Astronomy (A-6)
Physics
Space Physics Research Laboratory (P- l )
Plasma Physics and Environmental Perturbations Laboratory (P-2)
Cosmic Ray Physics Laboratory (P-3)
Physics and Chemistry Laboratory (P-4)
Earth Observations
Earth Observations Facility (ES-1)
Communications/Navigation
Communications/Navigation Research Facility (C/N-1)
Materials Science and Manufacturing
Materials Science and Manufacturing in Space (MS-1)
Technology
Contamination Measurements (T- l )
Fluid Management (T-2)
Extravehicular Activity (EVA) (T-3)
Advanced Spacecraft Systems Tests (T-4)
Teleoperations (T-5)
Life Sciences
Medical Research Facility (LS-1)
Vertebrate Research Facility (LS-2)
Plant Research Facility (LS-3)
Cells and Tissues Research Facility (LS-4)
Invertebrate Research Facility (LS-5)
Life Support and Protective Systems (LS-6)
Manned System Integration (LS-7)
20
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Sortie missions may have the Experiment Equipment either mounted on a
Pallet or contained within or attached to a manned Mission Support Module
(MSM). Figure 2-2 shows the arrangement within the Orbiter cargo bay of
several mission classes.
The SOAR study further divided the experiments into 56 Sub-FPEs or pay-
load elements (see Table 2-2). That study also addressed delivery, service,
and retrieval of automated spacecraft, four of which are shown in Fig. 2-3.
2.2 SUMMARY OF PRIMARY PARAMETERS AFFECTING
EXPERIMENT SAFETY
The primary parameters which affect experiment safety are summarized
in Table 2-3. Emphasis is directed to the inherent characteristics of
Experiment Equipment and its operations which can cause a potential hazard
due to a change in environmental conditions and/or energy. Also given are
the principal hazards directly associated with the Experiment Equipment and
its operation.
Many of the Experiments involve high voltage equipment, such as TV, imag-
ing tubes, inverters, pulsers, etc. Such equipment can cause personnel
injury due to shock, burns, etc., and/or fire due to high voltage arcing if
combustible materials are present.
A number of Experiments are designed for operation under vacuum conditions,
These require either EVA or a compartment that can be pressurized for set-
up, deployment, calibration, etc. Other equipment requires a pressurized
compartment for normal operations with the capability for reducing pressure
to space vacuum for certain experiment activities. Some Experiments
require high pressure gases which could become explosive sources.
Temperature extremes associated with the space environment as well as
cryogenics can cause structural and environmental hazards, including
22
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Table 2-2. FPE-Sub-FPE Relationships (Ref. 2)
Astronomy
A-l X-Ray Stellar Astronomy
A-2 Advanced Stellar Astronomy
A-2A Intermediate Stellar Telescope
A-3 Advanced Solar Astronomy
A-3A 1. 5m Photoheliograph/0. 25m XUV
Spectroheliograph/0. 5m X-Ray
Telescope
A-3B Solar Coronagraph
A-3C Photoheliograph
A-3D X-Ray Spectroheliograph
A-3E UV Long Wave Spectrometer
A-4 Interemdiate Size UV Telescopes
A-4A 0.5m Narrow Field UV Telescopes
A-4B 0.3m Wide Field UV Telescopes
A-4C Small UV Survey Telescopes
A-5 High Energy Astronomy
A-5A Lower Energy Experiment.
A-5B Higher Energy Experiment
A-6 IR Telescope
Physics
P-l Space Physics Research Lab
P-1A Atmospheric and Magneto Science
P-1B Cometary Physics
P-1C Meteoroid Science
P-1D Thick Material Meteoroid Penetration
P-1E Small Astronomy Telescopes
P-2 Plasma Physics and Environmental
Perturbation Lab
P-2A Wake Measurements from Station
and Booms
P-2B Wake Measurements from Subsatellites
P-2C Plasma Resonances
P-2D Wave Particle Interactions
P-2E Electron and Ion Beam Interaction
P-3 Cosmic Ray Physics Lab
P-3A Lab Without Total Absorption Device
P-3B Lab With Total Absorption Device
P-3C Plastic/Nuclear Emulsions
P-4 Physics and Chemistry Lab
P-4A Airlock and Boom Experiments
P-4B Flame Chemistry and Laser Experiments
P-4C Test Chamber Experiments
Earth Survey
ES-1 Earth Observation Facility
ES- 1A Meteorological and Atmospheric Science
ES-1B Land Use Mapping
ES-1C Air and Water Pollution
ES-1D Resource Recognition
ES-1E Natural Disasters
ES-1F Ocean Resources
ES-1G Minimum Payload
25
COM/NAV
C/N-1 Communications/Navigations Facility
C/N-1A COM/NAV Subgroup A
C/N-1B COM/NAV Subgroup B
Materials Science and Manufacturing
MS-1
MS-1IA 5-Day Group, Biological
MS-1IB 5-Day Group, Levitation
MS-1IC 5-Day Group, Furnace
MS-1ID 5-Day Group, Small and Low Temp
MS-1IIA 30-Day Group
MS-1IIB 30-Day Group
MS-1IIC 30-Day Group
MS-1IIIA Space Station Group
MS-HUB Space Station Group
MS-1IUC Space Station Group
MS-11IID Space Station Group
MS-HUE Space Station Group
Technology
T-l Contamination Measurements
T-1A Contamination Package 1
T-1B Contamination Package 2
T-2 Fluid Management
T-2A Long Term Cryogenic Storage
T-2B Short Term Cryogenic Storage
T-2C Slosh Propellant
T-2D Non-Cryogenic Storage 1
T-2E Non-Cryogenic Storage 2
T-3 EVA
T-3A Astronaut Maneuver Unit
T-3B Manned Work Platform
T-4 Advanced Spacecraft Systems Test
T-4A Long Duration Systems Tests
T-4B Medium Duration Tests
T-4C Short Duration Tests
T-5 Teleoperations
T-5A Initial Flight
T-5B Functional Manipulation
T-5C Ground Control
Life Science
LS-ST/A Minimal Medical Research Facility
(Station!
LS-ST/B Minimal Life Science Facility (Station)
LS-ST/C Interim Life Science Facility (Station)
LS-ST/D Dedicated Life Science Facility
(Station)
LS-SH/A 5-Day Life Science Facility (Shuttle)
LS-SH/B 10-Day Life Science Facility (Shuttle)
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pressure changes which might cause explosions or implosions. High
temperature processing operations, such as metal melting, casting, etc.,
combustion experiments, and the fire sensing and suppression experiment
could produce not only hazardous environmental temperature changes but
could also become a fire source if not properly contained.
Several Experiments involve the use of RF transmitters, X-ray machines,
high powered magnets, and lasers which have permeating fields. These fields
are a potential source of personnel injury (radiation effects), and by produc-
ing spurious noise signals may also adversely affect the operation of sensitive
equipment, including Orbiter operational and control equipment or instrumen-
tation. Strict control of the periods of operation for such Experiments may
have to be imposed in order to eliminate such potential hazards.
The nature of some of the Experiments involved introduces a wide range of
hazardous materials. These materials include cryogenics, propellants, film,
processing chemicals, plastic and nuclear emulsions, toxic serums, radio-
isotopes, etc. They are a potential source of personnel injury, contamination,
fire, explosion, control instrument malfunction, etc.
Other potential ignition sources are spark chambers, heaters, batteries, gas
jets, lasers, hot liquid metals and glasses, etc. The location of these sources
on board the Orbiter relative to combustible materials must be a prime safety
consideration for each Orbiter mission configuration.
Sub-satellites represent a potential for collisions which can result in space-
craft decompression and critical structural damage.
A comprehensive list of specific hazard sources, causative events, factors,
and conditions leading to potentially hazardous results is presented in
Vol. Ill, Part 2. The principal implications arising from the interactions
between Experiments and Experiment Equipment, the Orbiter, and Experi-
ment Modules (Pallet, MSM, RAM) are addressed in Section 3.
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3. EXPERIMENT INTERACTION SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
Performing experiments in connection with the Space Shuttle Orbiter could
result in emergency situations of well-recognized categories. The presence
and operation of Experiment Equipment do not cause hazards that are signifi-
cantly different from previously known space hazards. They do, however,
introduce an extremely broad range of specific hazard sources which are
additive to the hazards inherent in space operations.
The number of discrete hazards that can occur due to equipment or operation
of any experiment class (FPE) is related to the nature of the Experiment.
Materials Science and Manufacturing Experiment Modules, for example, have
more equipment of a hazardous nature than Earth Survey Experiment Modules.
However, this class-to-class differentiation loses significance when multiple
experiment categories are integrated into any one Experiment Module. The
definition of hazards with their resultant potential emergency situations have
to be based on the equipment that will actually be used. The synergistic effects
and the interactions between Experiment, Module, and Orbiter equipment and
instrumentation must be considered in order to reach a complete definition of
potential hazards and emergency situations attributable to a specific
Experiment.
The discussions in Section 2 regarding primary parameters affecting experi-
ment safety were necessarily directed to first-order effects because the
Experiments and their interfaces are not completely defined at present.
Equally important, from a safety standpoint, are the hazards arising from
less well defined potential interactions due to the integration of the diverse
Experiment Equipment. This section discusses interactions involving an
Experiment and related operational equipment that could have an impact on
the safety of the crew and the Orbiter.
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3. 1 EXPERIMENT-TO-EXPERIMENT INTERACTIONS
Within a given scientific discipline, such as Astronomy, the number and
characteristics of hazard sources varies as a function of the accommodation
mode (Pallet, MSM, or RAM). The number and types of scientific equipment
which can be carried and operated depend upon the available volume, weight
limitation, capacity for pressurization, thermal control, contamination
control, etc. For multiple-experiment missions, there is also the variation
in scientific and supporting equipment required for the different Experiments.
The hazards associated with the Experiments and their equipment, as shown
in Table 2-3, lead to a formidable list of potential emergencies. The less
demanding Experiments (in terms of both experiment and support equipment)
produce fewer hazards, while more complex or multiple-experiment combina-
tions produce a greater number of potential hazards.
In addition to the hazard sources that exist for any discrete scientific
Experiment Equipment, interference with other scientific or operational
equipment can endanger safety. For example, field-coupling effects (magnetic,
RF, nuclear, etc.), which could produce synergistic interactions, and thus
could activate or deactivate sensors, detectors, or control loops of other
Experiment Equipment, could result in:
a. Hazardous component/subsystem malperformance
b. Erroneous sequencing of hazardous equipment operation
c. Requirement for manual experiment operator control (to avoid
hazardous occurrence) at a time when an operator is not
available for such control
d. Overloading of electrical power system
e. Inadvertent start-up and/or shut-down of multiple
Experiment Equipment
3.2 EXPERIMENT-TO-MODULE INTERACTIONS
Emergency situations could also be produced by interactions which are related
to equipment configuration and placement within the Experiment Module
(Pallet, MSM, RAM, etc. ) in which the equipment is carried and operated.
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Therefore, consideration must be given to:
a. The density of packaging of Experiment Equipment within a
Module
b. The environment within the Module (i.e. , pressurized or
unpressurized)
c. Placement relative to Module (i.e. , whether "inside" Module
or attached "externally")
d. Degree of reliance on sensors, detectors, control loops, etc.
which are "experiment-specific" equipment, or which are
central equipment provided by the Module or the Orbiter
e. Effects of special remedial means included in the Module
(e.g. special fire detection and suppression equipment)
f. Start-up and shut-down procedures
The conduct of scientific experiments in ground laboratories devoted to a
variety of experiments generally allows separation of the different Experiment
Equipment, provisions for protective enclosures or walls between equipment
and operators, and isolation of caution and warning detectors as well as control
loops from the primary power source and experiment control systems and
stations.
The comparatively small volume available for Experiment Equipment within a
Module aboard the Space Shuttle Orbiter suggests centralization of auxiliary
equipment, such as central power conditioning and control units, data process-
ing units, caution and warning detectors and alarm systems, etc. , in order
to maximize the number of experiment packages and equipment for any Module
and mission. Such an approach is justifiable because it minimizes costs and
maximizes the scope of experiment activity that can be undertaken during
any one space mission. However, it could lead to a safety problem because
of interactions. Wall-to-wall experiment and control equipment, with its
potential for hazardous interactions and synergistic effects, suggests that
a careful and systematic systems integration approach for Modules housing
Experiment Equipment should be followed.
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3.3 EXPERIMENT-TO-ORBITER INTERACTIONS
The hazard-causing potential of Experiment Equipment can also provide
interactions with the Orbiter operational equipment and cause direct hazards
due to potential synergistic effects on diverse equipment within a Module or
the Orbiter.
All of the subsystems essential for the safety and well-being of the Orbiter
and its crew can be detrimentally affected by Experiment Equipment either
directly or indirectly, regardless of the location of the equipment. For
example, the electrical power system could be overloaded or rendered
inoperable; communications with other spacecraft and the ground could be
interrupted or cut; the Orbiter guidance and navigation system could be
rendered inaccurate or ineffective, etc.
During experiment operations, the orientation of the Experiment Module and
Experiment Equipment with respect to the Orbiter is of importance. For
example, the efflux from overboard vents could contaminate the cargo bay
and/or sensitive Orbiter elements (lenses, sensors, etc.).
3.4 INTERACTION SUMMARY
The experiment program foresees a large variety of Experiments aboard the
Space Shuttle on any one flight. The multitude of interactions between the
Experiment Equipment, experiment operations, Accommodation Modules,
experimenters, and Shuttle Orbiter operational equipment and crew creates
many potential hazards. Malfunctioning Experiment Equipment presents
discrete hazard sources; the potential hazards created could propagate to
other Experiment Equipment and supporting equipment and to operational
equipment of the Accommodating Module and the Orbiter.
Implementation of effective preventive or remedial measures to eliminate
or reduce to an acceptable level the safety risk of such experiment-related
hazards requires an integrated system approach. Such an approach demands
the preparation and coordination of failure mode and effect analyses and
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4. EXPERIMENT SAFETY GUIDELINES
4. 1 GUIDELINE SELECTION AND FORMULATION
CRITERIA
The Safety Guidelines listed in this chapter are expressed as brief summary
statements or expressions. The guidelines are intended to be used as safety
inputs into design, integration, and planning activities for all phases of the
Space Shuttle related experiment program and they can also be used as safety
checklists.
The judicious application of these Guidelines will be a step toward accomplish-
ing "Man-Compatibility" between Experiment Equipment and Experiment
operation with the Space Shuttle Orbiter. The term, "Man-Compatibility, "
implies that man-rating safety criteria shall be applied to those systems and
functions of a payload and its contents which could create a hazard to the
Orbiter and its crew, while the payload is -within the cargo bay, during its
deployment, and while it is in the vicinity of the Orbiter.
Vol. Ill, Part 2 describes how the Safety Guidelines were developed.
4. 2 THE HAZARD REDUCTION PRECEDENCE
SEQUENCE
The Safety Guidelines are not presented in order of absolute value as safety
measures. However, generally accepted safety practice indicates that the
order of precedence that should be followed in applying them is:
a. Design features to eliminate the hazard
b. Design features to control the hazard
c. Use of protective safety devices
d. Use of warning devices
e. Implementation of operational procedures
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4. 3 USE AND INTERPRETATION OF THE
SAFETY GUIDELINES
4. 3. 1 Format of the Guidelines
Figure 4-1 illustrates the guideline format and gives the explanation for the
abbreviated headings and codes used.
4. 3. 2 General Remarks
Many of the general Safety Guidelines (Table 4-1) apply to all Experiments and
Experiment Equipment; their applicability should be considered before con-
sidering the specific Guidelines (Table 4-2). The latter include only Guidelines
which either:
a. Are only applicable to the specific Experiment or
equipment group, or
b. Require wording sufficiently different from a general
guideline statement to communicate a particular safety
measure desired for the Experiment or equipment group,
or
c. Deserve particular emphasis for the Experiment or
equipment group addressed.
The Guidelines in a given area, such as Design (D) are not always independent
and may also require considerations as to Location (L) and Operations (O).
For example, for an item to be jettisoned, location of the item within the
Module or the Orbiter and the required operations for safely jettisoning that
item under emergency conditions require considerable attention. In some
cases, the application of a Guideline to several areas has been indicated by
adding one or more type identification letters. The Location (L) has received
emphasis in the Guidelines because contrary to usual space practice, the inte-
gration effort establishing the location of Experiment Equipment within a Module
or the Orbiter may not occur until long after the equipment proper has been
designed.
It is also emphasized that a Guideline may consider only one of several
possible approaches to enhance safety in a given potentially hazardous situation.
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Identification Number
O-G001
Guideline Statement
A contingency plan for every EE con-
figuration of an Orbiter flight shall be
prepared which establishes emergency
procedures to be followed in case an
E or EE causes an emergency. (The
plan shall include shutdown and back-
out procedures).
( 5 . 3 . 1 . 6 . 4 )
1
Reference para.
Vol. Ill, Part Z
no. of
GL applicable to:
o Experiment and/or Experiment Equipment
o Interface between Experiment and/or
Experiment Equipment and Accommodating
Vehicle (Orbiter, Pallet, MSM, RAM)
o Orbiter
o Experiment Module (Pallet, MSM, RAM)
Applicability to Mission Phase
o Launch (pad Ops through to Orbiter
injection)
o Deployment/Retrieval
o Experiment Operation
o Recovery (disposal, reentry, ground
return handling Ops, etc. )
G = General GL applicable to a large
variety of Experiments
A through Y = GL pertaining to a specific
class of Experiments (see Index on
p. 13 for listing)
O = Operation
«- * ,,, D = DesignType of GL:
 L = Loca
B
tion
R = Remedial
Abbreviations
E Experiment
EE Experiment Equipment
EM Experiment Module
* Pallet, MSM, RAM, etc.
Figure 4-1. Illustration of Guideline Format
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Furthermore, under certain conditions, some Guidelines may be conflicting
with respect to each other or Experiment requirements. Trade-off analyses
would have to be performed to determine the most satisfactory solution in each
instance. These trade-off analyses are beyond the scope of the present study.
The level of detail in the preventive measure assessment is in many cases
sufficient to overlap to a certain degree with generalized spacecraft safety
criteria, even though the present analysis was restricted to identifying
Experiment-related safety criteria. Typical overlap areas are:
a. Electrical systems (cable insulation, connectors, grounding,
power distribution paths, redundancy, shielding, routing, etc. )
b. Airlocks (mechanical design, materials, sealing provisions, etc.)
c. Vent systems (valves, regulators, location, pressure-relief, etc.)
d. Pressurized containers storing gases or liquids (valves,
regulators, pressure-relief, vents, etc.)
e. Batteries (electrolyte containment, venting, etc.)
f. Solid propellants ( safing, arming, etc.)
g. Minimum number of egress ports in a manned habitable
c ompa rtment
h. EVA
The Guidelines within this report are intended to be supplementary to the
generally accepted safety guidelines for manned space flight equipment and
operations and the types of areas listed above are referred to in the general
sense only.
4. 4 SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
Some of the results of recent studies conducted for NASA are directly appli-
cable to experiment safety. They should also be considered during experiment
design, experiment integration, mission planning, etc. These include:
a. The Prevention of Electrical Breakdown in Spacecraft (Ref. 4)
b. Safety in Earth Orbit (Ref. 5, 6, 7, 8)
c. Manned Space Flight Nuclear System Safety (Ref. 9)
d. Space Station Safety (Ref. 10)
e. Space Station Study, Experiment Safety (Ref. 11)
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Four other documents, even though not specifically safety oriented, should also
be of value:
a. Space Shuttle Baseline Accommodation for Payloads (Ref. 12)
b. Shuttle Orbiter/Payloads Monitor and Control Interface
(Ref. 13)
c. Assessment and Control of Spacecraft Electromagnetic
Interference (Ref. 14)
d. Shuttle Orbiter Applications and Requirements,
Phase II (SOAR)(Ref. 15)
41
Table 4-1. Safety Guidelines — General
Application (Sheet 1 of 11)
Number
D-G001
L
0
D-G002
D-G003
D-G004
D-G005
D-G006
D-G007
E
xp
er
im
en
t 
1
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
E
xp
/V
eh
ic
le
 
1
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
O
rb
it
er
 
1
*
V
•o
o2
fr-H
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
SAFETY GUIDELINES
The field strength (magnetic, RF,
nuclear radiation, etc.) of any single
EE or combination of EEs shall not
cause any injury to the crew or inter-
ference with the operation of or damage
to other EE and/or any EM or Orbiter
systems or crew.
(5 .1 .6 .1)
EE shall be designed to withstand rapid
AP changes without causing a hazard-
ous condition.
(5. 1. 12.13)
Fluid and electrical components of EE
shall fail safe .
(5 .1 .7 .2 )
EE and other subsystems within an EM
shall be configured and packaged for
retention of integrity and containment
of contents during the load and tem-
perature environments of all mission
phases, including all intact aborts.
(5. 1. 12. 10)
Provisions shall be made to prevent
EE and EMs from crushing the Orbiter
cabin during an Orbiter crash landing
which would not otherwise have resulted
in catastrophic damage to the cabin.
Failure of any subsystem within an EE
or EM shall be contained and shall not
propagate to the Orbiter.
(5 .1 .12.11)
All EE shall consider the number and
types of hazard sources within the
limited volume of an EM and their
potential interactions and synergistic
effects .
(5 .1 .12 .12)
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E and EE integration in an EM shall
include provisions for monitoring EE
so that the crew can assess emergen-
cies and take action.
( 5 . 3 . 5 . 1 )
EE or combinations of EE shall be
automatically shut down to prevent
overheating.
(5 .1 .4 )
Fluid line connectors shall have
connect/disconnect features which
ensure fast operation, cleanliness of
the connection, and positive locking.
(5 .1 .7 .2 )
Fluid connectors shall be individually
marked and keyed to identify the
nature of the fluid involved and to
prevent mixing.
(5 .1 .12 .9 )
Fluid piping and connectors in an EM
shall be accessible.
(5. 1 .12.14)
Overboard vent systems shall be
provided for those EE susceptible to
pressure buildup or the accumulation
of flammable, toxic, or noxious sub-
stances (e . g. , batteries, dewars, gas
bottles, furnaces, e tc . )
( 5 . 1 . 1 . 1 )
Connectable vent provisions in an EM
shall include a vent terminal board.
( 5 . 1 . 1 . 1 )
The overboard vent system shall have
a capacity for venting individual and all
EE, including separate vent lines as
required by the fluid vented.
( 5 . 1 . 1 . 1 )
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Overboard vent systems shall be
configured to:
a. Avoid common or adjacent exit
ports for combustible or
reactive effluents.
(5 .1 .1 .2 )
b. Prevent vent efflux from entering
the Orbiter cargo bay.
(5 .1 .1 .2 )
c. Prevent vent efflux in the vicinity
of sensitive equipment (e .g . ,
telescopes, camera lenses ,
gaskets, etc.)
(5 .1 .1 .2 )
For flammable gases venting over-
board, an igniter at the Orbiter venting
port shall be considered for post
landing ignition to assure that no
flammable gas can envelop the Orbiter
on the ground.
Means shall be provided to permit
controlled venting during critical
operations (e. g ., EVA, docking,
etc.) which also permits a quick
pressure relief of the vent system in
case an emergency should arise during
a no- venting period.
(5 .1 .1 .3)
Provisions shall be made to prevent
EE operation in case of vent system
malfunction.
(5.1.8 .1 .1)
Electrical discharge means shall be
provided to establish equipotential
between the Orbiter and satellites or
EMs to be retrieved.
(5 .1 .8 .5)
Automatic means shall be provided to
discharge high-voltage EE after
shutdown.
(5 .1 .8 .5)
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The operation of high voltage EE shall
be indicated prominently on the master
experiment monitoring panel.
(5 .1 .12 .8 )
No equipment whose malfunction could
obstruct free passage shall be located,
internally or externally, near crew
access and egress passageways
through airlocks, tunnel, and docking
ports ( e .g . , pressure bottles,
batteries, etc. j.
(5.1.12.15)
Whenever an Orbiter flight carries EE
aboard which could cause a hazard for
which the normally carried emergency
equipment is not suitable, appropriate
emergency equipment shall be provided
( e . g . , appropriate fire extinguishers,
de contaminants, protective gear,
antidotes, etc.).
(5 .1 .8 .8 )
Jettisoning of malfunctioning EE which
might cause a major hazard to the
crew or the Orbiter shall be con-
sidered (e.g. , EE or EMs which
cannot be fully retracted into the
Orbiter, propellant tanks, sub-
satellites, etc .) .
(5.1.9)
Provisions for dumping hazardous
fluids in case of an emergency shall be
considered.
(5 .1 .9 )
If emergency dumping of fluids is
determined to be a requirement, pro-
visions shall be made so that dumping
can be done during any phase of the
mission, including the phase of aero-
dynamic flight of the Orbiter and on
the ground.
A modular approach shall be con-
sidered for the design of hazardous EE
components to enable remote deploy-
ment and operations, and retrieval.
(5 .1 .10)
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Table 4-1. Safety Guidelines - General
Application (Sheet 5 of 11)
Number
D-G031
O
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SAFETY GUIDELINES
Special work areas shall be provided
for Es which require containment of
spills, disposal of wastes, venting of
toxic gases, prevention of contamina-
tion, etc. such as glove boxes, double
containment, etc. Such areas may
require separate environmental con-
trol. (Applicable to Es such as film
processing, biologicals, animal
handling, toxic serums, radioactive
materials, etc.)
(5 .3 .1 .4)
Manual interlocks shall be provided
which require a knowledgeable act to
operate EE.
(5 .1 .8 .1 .2)
Safing shall be provided to prevent
inadvertent actuation of EE that could
result in a hazardous situation
(e .g . , equipment containing solid
propellants, squibs, etc.) .
(5 .1 .3 .1 )
Means for positive holding and securing
of transportable equipment shall be
provided.
(5.1.11.1)
EE containers for hazardous fluids,
such as toxic liquids, emulsions, etc.
shall have handles and lids with
positive closures to prevent spills and
contamination .
(5 .1 .12 .6)
EE containers with removable lids
containing hazardous materials
( e . g . , toxic fluids, serums, etc.)
shall be prominently and permanently
marked as to their contents and with
warning and handling notes (which
include antidote information).
(5 .1 .12 .9 )
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Table 4-1. Safety Guidelines — General
Application (Sheet 6 of 11)
Number
D-G037
D-G038
D-G039
D-G040
D-G041
D-G042
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Flammability requirements for
materials in the EM shall be identical
to those of the Orbiter except where an
E requires a combustible material; in
that case, precautionary measures
shall be employed.
(5 .1 .13 .2 )
Hg shall be avoided in EE. If Hg is
indispensable, accidentally escaped Hg
must be prevented from entering
habitable compartments (e. g. by
locating it outside such compartments,
double containment, e tc . ) , as spilled
Hg cannot be removed completely and
will permanently poison the compart-
ment atmosphere.
(5.1.13.3)
E with radioactive materials shall be
performed in separate work areas
which provide double containment,
have environmental control,
radiological monitoring and decon-
tamination equipment, and waste
storage and disposal provisions.
( 5 . 1 . 5 . 4 )
E and EE shall be designed for
minimum EVA.
(5 .1 .10)
Capability shall be provided to purge
the Orbiter cargo bay in the event of
accidental release of hazardous EE
efflux into it .
( 5 . 3 . 2 . 2 )
Caution and Warning signals shall be
provided. Their display (visual and/or
aural) and location (on Orbiter flight
deck or lower deck, or in EM) depends
on the particular hazard condition
and severity. The signals shall
include:
a. changes in the EM atmosphere
with regard to pressure, tem-
perature, humidity, and
incidences of fire or
contamination .
( 5 . 3 . 4 . 1 )
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Table 4-1. Safety Guidelines —General
Application (Sheet 7 of 11)
Number
D-G043
D-G044
D-G045
D-G046
D-G047
D-G048
D-G049
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D-G05I
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SAFETY GUIDELINES
b. changes in EE temperature and/or
pressure levels, where these
parameters are indicative of EE
operational safety.
(5.3.4.1)
c. status of EM airlock EC/LS pres-
sure levels and door positions
(5.3 .4 .1)
d. improper velocity and/or align-
ment of a docking spacecraft
relative to the EM or Orbiter
docking port.
(5.3.4.1)
e. position and status of the Orbiter
payload erection/retraction
system.
(5.3 .4 .1)
f . status of overboard vent system.
(5 .3 .4 .1)
g. operation of hazardous EE (high
voltage, strong permeating
fields, etc.)
(5.3.4.1)
h. status of solid propellant safe-
and-arm circuits.
(5.3.4.1)
All high pressure fluid lines shall be
tied down to prevent whipping in case
of a failure of the line or connections.
Automatic relays for switching to
back-up power shall respond also to
gradual loss of primary power.
(Applicable to EE for which power
failure could create a hazard).
(Suggested by Lunar Landing
Training Vehicle Accident
in 1971)
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Table 4-1. Safety Guidelines - General
Application (Sheet 8 of 11)
Number
D-G052
D-G053
D-G054
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SAFETY GUIDELINES
EM subsystem designs shall be based
on at least a fail safe concept except
for structure which shall be based on a
safe life concept. Subsystem
redundancy shall only be used to
achieve mission success and fail safe
design goals or to reduce cost.
(Adapted from Sortie Lab.
Guidelines and Constraints)
Access shall be provided for all
installed EE requiring short term
periodic maintenance on the ground and
on orbit. (Delays during launch or in
orbit; feeding and drinking of animals,
cage cleaning, e tc .)
(5.2.5.11)
All docking ports shall be located so
as to assure visual observation of the
docking operations.
( 5 . 2 . 5 . 1 0 )
EE producing heat shall be arranged in
such a manner as to minimize thermal
control requirements.
(5 .2 .4 .8)
Exteriorly mounted EE, such as
booms, platforms, antennas, etc.,
shall be located away from docking
ports to prevent potential collisions.
( 5 . 2 . 4 . 3 )
The location of EMs and EE shall be
such as hot to interfere with any egress
from or ingress to airlock hatches of
the Orbiter tunnel (neither in the
installed nor in the extended position).
(5 .2 .5 .9) (5.2.5.8)
Sufficient space shall be provided when
locating EE so as to allow an IVA
suited man to pass by regardless of
the position of movable exterior EE
parts.
(5 .2 .5 .12)
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Table 4-1. Safety Guidelines — General
Application (Sheet 9 of 11)
Number
O-G001
O-G002
O-G003
O-G004
O-G005
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SAFETY GUIDELINES
For each Orbiter flight, a contingency
plan for its particular EE arrangement
shall be prepared which outlines
emergency procedures to be followed
for the case of an E-related emer-
gency. (This plan shall include shut-
down and backout procedures).
(5 .3 .1 .6 .4 .1)
One man in the Orbiter shall be
responsible for implementing safety
and contingency plans .
(5 .3 .1 .6 .4 .2)
Schedules for loading/unloading and
deployment/retrieval shall be prepared
and implemented for EE. These
schedules shall consider the particular
safety requirements of each EE, such
as environmental, structural, con-
tamination etc. ( e . g . , isotope heat
sources requiring thermal
conditioning) .
(5.3. 1.6.4. 3)
Startup and shutdown procedures shall
be established for all EE. The
sequencing shall minimize effects on
other EE and have no adverse effects
on Orbiter operating systems.
( 5 . 3 . 1 . 6 . 4 . 4 )
EE containing nuclear materials shall
conform with established nuclear safety
requirements .
( 5 . 3 . 1 . 6 . 4 . 5 )
Order-of- connection for EE shall be
established for every fluid connection
involving cryogenic, explosive, or
flammable mixtures. (For example,
(1) electrical; (2) HZ; (3) QZ-)
Disconnection shall be analyzed on an
individual basis.
( 5 . 3 . 1 . 6 . 4 . 6 )
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Table 4-1. Safety Guidelines — General
Application (Sheet 10 of 11)
Number
O-G007
O-G008
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SAFETY GUIDELINES
Radiation dose-accumulation by the
crew shall be monitored with accepted
health physics equipment at all times
to guard against excessive radiation
from EE and natural sources.
(5.3.1.1.1)
Protective garments, gloves, face
masks, etc. , shall be worn by the crew
when handling EE or contents capable
of causing injury or illness by contact
or inhalation.
(5.3.1.1.2)
EE posing severe risks (potential
explosions, fire, open flames, release
of ionizing radiation, liquid metals,
release of toxic gases or vapors)
should preferably be conducted on a
free-flying EM.
( 5 . 3 . 1 . 2 . 1 )
EE with strong RF or magnetic field
sources shall not be transported on the
same Orbiter flight with payloads
having solid-propellant propulsive
stages unless appropriate precau-
tionary measures are incorporated.
(See also D-G033)
( 5 . 3 . 1 . 5 . 2 )
All transportable containers in the EM
shall be secured in their respective
storage areas after use.
(5 .3 .2 .4 )
EE and operations requiring immediate
or concurrent measures to prevent
hazardous situations shall be monitored
and controlled on a continuous or
scheduled basis (as appropriate).
(5 .3 .5 .1 )
The total radiation level environment to
which the Orbiter and EM have been
subjected shall be monitored and
controlled.
(5 .3 .5 .1 )
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Table 4-1. Safety Guidelines — General
Application (Sheet 11 of 11)
Number
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SAFETY GUIDELINES
Es involving the use of chemicals
within a pressure compartment shall
be evaluated for the necessity of having
their own independent environmental
control system so as to prevent pos-
sible contamination of the EM or
Orbiter by toxic gases or vapors.
( 5 . 3 . 1 . 5 . 4 )
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Table 4-2A. Safety Guidelines -
High-Temperature Sources
Number
D-A001
D-A002
D-A003
D-A004
O-A001
SEE ALSO
D-G013
D-G027
D-O030
D-G031
L-G001
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SAFETY GUIDELINES
Gas jets, Combustors, Furnaces,
Fire- sensing and Suppression Module,
Liquid Metals and Glasses
High temperature EE shall have
available:
a. Purging and fire- suppression
equipment.
( 5 . 1 . 2 . 1 )
b. Protective covers and guards.
(5 .1 .8 .2 ) (5 .1 .8 .4)
c. Venting provisions.
. (5 .2 .3 .3)
d. Double containment, depending
on its nature .
High-temperature EE shall be
maintained deactivated until used for
experimentation.
( 5 . 3 . 2 . 6 )
L
au
nc
h
X
X
X
D
ep
lo
y/
 
1
R
et
ri
ev
e
 
1
X
X
m
&
fr
u
X
X
X
X
X
1 
R
ec
ov
er
y 
1
X
X
X
^Pallet , MSM, RAM, etc.
65
Table 4-2B. Safety Guidelines — Lasers
Number
D-B001
D-BOOZ
D-B003
SEE ALSO:
D-G032
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SAFETY GUIDELINES
Laser Experiments; Laser- radar
Equipment
Shielding shall be provided to protect the
crew and equipment from exposure to
damaging laser radiation! should include
absorbing material located between the
laser beam target and the structure).
(5.1.5.2) (5 .1 .8 .4) (5 .1 .8 .6 )
Stops and interlocks shall be provided
to prevent laser operation outside a
shielded area.
(5.1.8.3) ( 5 . Z . 2 . 2 )
The operation of laser EE shall be
indicated prominently on the master
experiment monitoring panel.
(5 .3 .4 .1 )
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Table 2-4C. Safety Guidelines —Spark Chambers
Number .
D-C001
SEE ALSO:
D-G013
D-G026
D-GOZ7
D-G030
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SAFETY GUIDELINES
Spark chambers and associated A and
CH4 tanks shall be evaluated for being
designed as self-contained units with
the capability of remote storage and
deployment, and of jettisoning.
(5. 1.9) (5. 1. 12.5)
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Table 4-2D. Safety Guidelines -
Permeating-Field Generators
Number
D-D001
D-D002
O-D001
SEE ALSO
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SAFETY GUIDELINES
Magnets, RF Transmitters
The operation of RF generators and
magnetic- field devices shall be
indicated prominently on the master
experiment monitoring panel.
(5 .3 .4.1)
EE with permeating fields shall be
shielded from sensitive EE, personnel
and animals, and Orbiter systems, so
as to preclude interference with
operations or damage and injury.
( 5 . 2 . 4 . 1 )
E using magnetic or RF fields may
have to be scheduled to prevent
interference with Orbiter operational
control.
(5 .3 .1 .5 .3)
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Table 4-2E. Safety Guidelines -
Scientific Airlocks
Number
D-E001
D-EOOZ
L-E001
SEE ALSO:
D-G032
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SAFETY GUIDELINES
A Scientific Airlock and any associated
deployment mechanisms shall permit
jettisoning of hazardous objects
contained within.
(5 .1 .9)
An indication shall be provided for the
open and closed door positions of a
Scientific Airlock and for excessive
leak rate of the airlock.
(5.3.4.1)
A Scientific Airlock shall be located in
the EM in such a manner that an open
airlock door will not prevent Orbiter
cargo bay door operation.
(5 .2 .3 .1)
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Table 4-2F. Safety Guidelines — Subsatellites
Number
D-FOOl
L-F001
SEEALSO:
D-GOZZ
D-G023
D-G027
D-G030
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SAFETY GUIDELINES
Consideration shall be given to the
design of Subsatellites which provides
the capability for remote storage,
deployment and jettisoning. Remote
deployment can avoid the need for
deployment through airlocks.
(5.1.9) (5.1.10)
Subsatellites shall be located outside
of habitable EM compartments .
(5 .2 .1 )
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Table 4-2H. Safety Guidelines -
Rotating Equipment
Number
D-H001
D-HOOZ
D-H003
O
D-H004
D-H005
0-H001
SEE ALSO:
D-G032
L-G004
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SAFETY GUIDELINES
Scientific Centrifuges, Manned
Centrifuges, Ergometer, Rotating
Litter Chair
Shielding shall be provided around
rotating components for containment
in case of breakup due to over speed.
(5.1.5.1)
A non-hazardous mode of failure which
occurs prior to a potential catastrophic
breakup of rotating components due to
over speed shall be incorporated.
(5.1.7.1)
Means shall be provided to prevent the
operation of rotating equipment unless
the Orbiter attitude control system is
operational.
(5 .1 .8.1.1)
Means shall be provided to shut off
rotating EE when its design speed is
exceeded.
(5 .3 .4 .1)
A backup locking device shall be
provided for rotatable EE in case of
failure of the primary locking
mechanism.
(5 .1 .8 .9)
Human centrifuge operations shall be
monitored and controlled on a con-
tinuous basis.
(5 .3 .5 .1 )
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Table 4-21. Safety Guidelines —Telescopes
Number
D-I001
D-I002
L-IOOZ
SEE ALSO:
L-G004
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SAFETY GUIDELINES
Optical. IR, UV, X-ray
All direct viewing telescopes shall
have means (such as a fast acting
filter) to protect the viewer's eyes in
case the field of view is inadvertently
exposed to direct or reflected sunlight.
(5 .1 .8 .Z)
All telescopes shall be provided with
remotely operated lens covers so that
they can be covered during non-use
periods. (No EVA for routine
covering and uncovering shall be
permitted).
(5.1.8.2)
Sufficient room shall be provided at the
viewing end of a telescope so that the
operator has free egress with the
telescope locked in any position.
( 5 . 2 . 2 . 1 )
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Table 4-2J. Safety Guidelines -
Extendable/Retractable Devices
Number
D-J001
D-J002
SEE ALSO
D-G027
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SAFETY GUIDELINES
Booms/Platforms/Antennas ,
Erection/Retraction Mechanisms
Extendable EE shall be evaluated for
the necessity of being jettisoned.
(5 .1 .9 ) ( 5 . 3 . 3 . 1 )
Means shall be provided to indicate
operation of EE extension mechanisms.
(5.3.4.1)
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Table 4-2K. Safety Guidelines -Balloons
Number
0-K001
D
SEE ALSO:
D-G032
D-G033
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SAFETY GUIDELINES
Balloons and balloon inflating devices
shall be maintained in a deactivated
state until use. The balloon and the
inflating device shall not be connected
until inflation.
(5.2.4.4) (5 .3 .2 .6)
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Table 4-2L. Safety Guidelines —
Negative Pressure Source
Number
D-L001
D-L002
O-L001
5EEALSO:
D-G032
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SAFETY GUIDELINES
Lower Body Negative Pressure
Chamber (LBNPC)
Attachment of a vacuum source to the
LBNPC shall be impossible without
having appropriate control provisions
in the connecting line.
(5 .1 .6 .1 )
Automatic means shall be provided for
a controlled shutdown of the LBNPC
experiment in the event the vacuum
decreases below the permissible level.
(5 .1 .8 .1 .1)
The LBNPC shall be maintained in a
deactivated status until time for the
experiment.
(5 .3 .2 .6 )
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Table 4-2M. Safety Guidelines -
EVA-Use Devices
Number
D-M001
D-MOOZ
L-MOQ1
L-M002
O-M001
O-M002
SEE ALSO:
D-G027
D-G030
D-G032
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SAFETY GUIDELINES
Astronaut Maneuvering Unit (AMU),
Maneuverable Work Platform (MWP),
Teleoperated Spacecraft
Failure modes shall be non -thrusting
for EVA EE propulsion systems.
(5.1.7.1)
The EM shall be provided with external
attach and holding means for EVA,
EE and EVA men.
(5.1.11.3)
EVA EE shall be located exterior to
habitable EM compartments, except
for small devices which can be easily
carried through an airlock.
(5 .2 .1)
Externally-mounted EVA EE shall
permit unimpeded egress and access
through an EVA hatch by men.
(5.2 .5 .5)
AMU and MWP operations shall be
conducted in the tethered mode unless
the performance of an E requires
otherwise.
(5.3 . 1.6.2.1)
AMU and MWP propulsion subsystems
shall be continuously monitored during
E operations and deactivated upon
indication of a malfunction.
( 5 . 3 . 1 . 6 . 2 . 2 )
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Table 4-2N. Safety Guidelines —
Solid PropeHants
Number
D-N001
O-N001
SEE ALSO:
D-G03Z
D-G049
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Solid Rocket Motors, Pyrotechnics,
Squibs, Spin-up Rockets, etc.
Safing mechanisms shall be provided to
prevent inadvertent activation of solid-
propellant- containing EE units.
(5.1.3.1)
All solid- propellant- containing systems
shall be safed prior to ground
installation or retrieval.
(5 .3 .2 .5)
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Table 4-2O. Safety Guidelines -
Radiation Sources
Number
D-O001
D-O002
SEEALSO:
D-G001
D-G027
D-G031
D-G03Z
D-G033
D-G039
8-B001-G005
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X-ray Machines, Radioisotopes,
Lasers, RF Transmitters,
Radioisotope Thermal Generators
(RTGs)
Monitoring systems shall be provided
for EE with radiation field sources.
(.5.3.4.1)
Provisions shall be made for the
storage and/or disposal of radioactive
waste or other materials contaminated
by isotopes, etc. ( e . g . excreta of
animals injected with tracer isotopes,
biological samples, etc.) .
(5.1.5.4)
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Table 4-2P. Safety Guidelines -
Cameras and Equipment
Number
L-P001
SEE ALSO:
D-G031
D-G032
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Cameras, Film, Film Vault, Film
Processor, Processing Chemicals
Film, photochemicals , and film vaults
shall be located away from potential
ignition sources and remote from open
habitable EM compartments.
( 5 . 2 . 5 . Z )
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Table 4-2Q. Safety Guidelines -Batteries
Number
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Table 4-2R. Safety Guidelines — Electrically-Powered
Equipment
Number
SEE
D-G001
D-G023
D-G024
D-G032
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TV, Inverters, Pulsers, Furnaces,
Accelerators, Transmitters, etc.
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Table 4-2S. Safety Guidelines - Biologicals/
Animals/Insects/Plants (Sheet 1 of 2)
Number
D-S001
D-S002
D-S003
D-S004
D-S005
D-S006
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Cages, Cells and Tissues, Organisms
and Cultures, Animals, Insects,
Plants, Nutrient, Waste, etc.
Holding and rearing cages containing a
potentially hazardous atmosphere shall
have provisions for controlled emer-
gency venting in the event of a mal-
function of the pressure regulating
system of the cage.
(5 .1 .1 .1 )
Animal cage pressure shall be kept
below that of the EM to avoid possible
contamination of the EM atmosphere.
The cage atmosphere return flow shall
not pass through a habitable compart-
ment unless the air has been cleaned.
(5 .1 .4 .2)
Means shall be provided to prevent
excreta of animals from floating in the
cages, and to facilitate their removal
and storage.
(5 .1 .12 .1 )
Cages shall have means, preferably
automatic, for animal feeding and
drinking on the ground as well as in
orbit.
(5. 1. 10) (5.1.12. 1)
Means shall be provided to permit
cleaning animals and animal cages
from excreta, vomit, lice, fleas,
etc . , both on the launch pad and in
orbit .
(5.1.12.1)
All animal cages shall be designed
with provisions to protect the
inhabitants against injury from both
their own movements and acceleration
forces.
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Table 4-2S. Safety Guidelines - Biologicals/
Animals/Insects/Plants (Sheet Z of 2)
Number
D-S007
D-S008
D-S009
L-S001
D
O-S001
O-S002
SEE ALSO:
D-G013
D-G031
D-G032
D-G053
O-G005
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Animal cages to be used for experi-
ments involving radioactive tracers
shall be designed to safeguard against
the possibility of radiological con-
tamination of the crew . (For example,
cage isolation through an airlock.
location in a double containment shell
or a separate compartment, an
independent EC/LS system, special
means for removal and storage of
animal excreta, means for decon-
tamination, e tc . ) .
( 5 . 3 . 1 . 4 )
All EM compartments containing
microbiological experiments, and
airlocks leading to those compartments.
shall be monitored for contamination.
Provisions for neutralizing
microbes involved shall be considered.
(5 .3 .1 .4)
Provisions shall be available for
preserving and storing dead animals,
insects, plant specimens, etc.
( e . g . , formaldehyde, storage bags,
etc. ).
( 5 . 1 . 1 2 . 2 )
All plant life shall be isolated so as to
avoid contamination by pollen, leaves.
etc.
(5 .3 .1 .4 )
Biological experimentation and uncaged
animal, insect and plant handling
operations shall be performed in
special work areas. (See also
D-G031).
(5 .3 .1 .4 )
Animal feeding and cleaning devices
shall be monitored on a scheduled
basis .
(5 .3 .5 .1 )
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Table 4-2T. Safety Guidelines -
Fluids and Gases
Number
D-T001
D-T002
D-T003
L-T001
O-T001
O-TOOZ
SEE ALSO:
D-G013
D-G027
D-G030
D-G031
D-C001
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SAFETY GUIDELINES
LHe, LNe, LHz, LOz. ICN. NH3,
NzH4, O2, N2, He, Argon, Methane,
Misc. Chemicals, Nutrients, Wastes,
etc.
All compartments containing E or EE
which could release toxic gases,
vapors, or fluids shall contain monitor-
ing and warning equipment. Equipment
for cleanup shall be provided.
(5.3.5.1)
Means shall be provided to purge EE
containing hazardous fluids.
(5 .1 .2 .1)
Containers holding non- inert fluids
shall be purged at the completion of
experiments or prior to return to
Earth.
(5.1.2.2)
Tanks containing fluids which can reac»
with each other shall be separated as
far as possible.
(5 .2 .4 .6)
All containers to be returned to Earth
shall be verified that they can safely
enter the atmosphere.
(5 .3 .2 .3)
Containers with hazardous fluids shall
be monitored while aboard the Orbiter
or in its vicinity.
(5.3.5.1)
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Table 4-21]. Safety Guidelines —Emulsions
Number
D-U001
L-U001
O-U001
SEE ALSO:
D-G027
D-G030
D-G032
0-G005
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Plastic and Nuclear Emulsions
Emulsion sheets shall be configured
with protective covers or guards to
prevent chemical contact injuries.
(5.1.8.2)
Emulsion sheet EE shall be located for
transport to orbit exterior to EM habi-
table compartments if the chemicals
pose outgassing problems, unless
special containment provisions are
incorporated .
(5.2.1)
Deployment of emulsion sheets by
remote mechanisms shall be
considered.
(5.3.1.2.2)
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Table 4-ZV. Safety Guidelines — Contamination —
Experiment Equipment
Number
D-V001
SEE ALSO:
D-GOZ7
D-G030
D-G031
D-G032
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SAFETY GUIDELINES
The Active Cleaning Device (ACD),
Contamination Sample Plates and
Racks
The ACD shall be provided with covers
or end closures to prevent exposure of
the crew to contaminants contained
within the ACD.
(5 .1 .12 .7) (5.1.8.2)
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Table 4-2W. Safety Guidelines -
Recharging Systems
Number
D-W001
O-W001
SEE ALSO:
D-GOZ7
D-G030
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Gas Bottle and Battery Recharging
Means shall be provided for gas bottle
and battery recharging systems to
prevent operations until positive
connections are assured.
(5 .1 .8 .1 .1)
Gas bottle and battery recharging
operations shall be monitored and
controlled on a continuous basis .
(5 .3 .5 .1 )
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Table 4-2X. Safety Guidelines -EVA
Operations (Sheet 1 of 2)
Number
D-X001
D-X002
D-X003
D-X004
L-X001
L-X002
O-X001
0-X002
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Extendable - aid devices ( e . g . , lassos,
telescoping rods, etc.) shall be
provided to permit assistance in EVA.
(5 .1 .8 .7)
Emergency EC/LS umbilicals shall be
provided on the EM exterior for use by
an EVA man.
(5.1.8.8)
EVA suits and PLSS units, including
voice communication, shall be designed
for plug-in of an emergency PLSS
package.
(5.1.12.3)
The EM and/or Orbiter shall be
provided with exterior connections
(preferably near EVA airlocks) for
plug-in of EC/LS umbilicals and voice
communication.
(5.2.5 .6) (5.1.12.4)
EE exterior to the EM shall be located
away from EM and Orbiter EVA
hatches to prevent collisions, tether
entanglement, etc.
(5 .2 .4 .2)
EVA tether attach points and fixtures
shall be located so as to minimize
possibility of tether entanglement.
(5.2.5.7)
Particularly hazardous EVA experi-
ment operations shall be conducted by
at least two EVA men, one of them
performing the work and the other
being a Safety Man standing by
equipped for immediate emergency
action. (5 .3 .1 .6 .1 .3)
For normal EVA experiment operations
two EVA men shall work as a "Buddy"
team. (5 .3 .1 .6 .1 .2 )
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Table 4-2X. Safety Guidelines -EVA
Operations (Sheet 2 of 2)
Number
O-X003
O-X004
O-X005
SEE ALSO:
D-G040
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An additional crewman shall be suited
and ready to go into EVA in the event
of an emergency to assist any of the
men already in EVA.
(5.3.1.6.4)
Experiment EVA shall be avoided when
high- voltage, RF fields, or magnetic
fields are present; during Experiment
Module erection or deployment,
retraction or docking operations; near
attitude control nozzle jets, etc.
(5.3.1.6.1.8)
EVA operations and PLSS conditions
during EVA operations shall be con-
tinuously monitored (including direct
or video viewing) .
(5.3.5.1)
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Table 4-2Y. Safety Guidelines — E g r e s s Operations
Number
D-Y001
O-Y001
O-Y002
O-Y003
O-Y004
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SAFETY GUIDELINES
Pressure suits (including PLSS units)
shall be provided for emergency EVA
egress from the EM to reenter the
Orbiter (via the Orbiter EVA airlock).
(5. 3.1. 6.3. Z)
A second or safety crewman shall
stand by during airlock operations in
case assistance is needed.
(5 .3 .1 .6 .3 .1)
Routine entry into an EM shall not be
initiated until the EM is fully erected
and secured, and interface circuits
have been checked out.
(5 .3 .1 .6 .3 .3)
All personnel shall leave the EM and
enter the Orbiter prior to retraction
of the EM .
(5 .3 .1 .6 .3 .4)
Airlock and crew conditions shall be
continuously monitored during airlock
operations.
(5.3.5.1)
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Table 4-3. Safety Guidelines —Remedial
Application (Sheet 1 of 2)
Number
R-G001
R-G002
R-G003
R-G004
R-G005
R-G006
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For combustible material, the fire of
which could not be extinguished by the
normally available fire-fighting equip-
ment, special equipment for extinguish-
ing the particular type of potential fire
shall be provided.
(6.2.1)
Fast donning short-time life support
for use under emergency conditions
shall be provided in an EM commen-
surate with potential emergency con-
ditions caused by Es and EE.
(6 .2 .2 )
In addition to normal medical provi-
sions and supplies, equipment and
trained personnel shall be provided to
cope with potential medical problems
which are peculiar to the diverse range
of experiments on board ( e .g . , RF
field exposure, contact with emulsions
or isotopes, vapor inhalation, bacterial
exposure, biological diseases , etc.).
(6 .2 .3)
To cope with accidental equipment -
peculiar contamination on board
(e .g . , toxic gases or vapors, isotopes,
insects, bacteria, etc.), equipment and
trained personnel for the specific
problem shall be available.
(6 .2 .4 )
Materials, equipment, and trained
personnel shall be provided for
emergency repair of the primary
pressure shell of an EM.
(6 .2 .5 )
Tools, other equipment, and trained
personnel shall be provided for
removing equipment whose position
prevents required Orbiter or EM
operations (e .g . , protuberances pre-
venting cargo bay door closure, e tc . ) .
( 6 . 2 . 6 )
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Table 4-3. Safety Guidelines -Remedial
Application (Sheet 2 of 2)
Number
R-G007
R-G008
R-G009
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SAFETY GUIDELINES
Emergency access equipment (cutting
tools, knock-out or blow-out panels,
etc.) shall be provided to enable access
to and the egress of crew members
entrapped within airlocks or compart-
ments of an EM.
(6 .2 .7 )
Transfer equipment shall be provided
to enable transfer to the Orbiter of
crew members stranded in EVA or
from a vehicle unable to close-
rendezvous or dock.
(6.2 .8)
Personnel shall be provided who are
trained in the requisite operational
techniques for rendering aid and
assistance to injured, entrapped, and
stranded crew members in the same or
adjacent compartments or in EVA
operations.
( 6 . 2 . 9 )
Note:
R-G001 through R-G007 are essentially
also applicable for the launch and
recovery facilities.
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Safety Guidelines presented in Tables 4-1 through 4-3 are initial guide-
lines applicable to experiment safety for experiments expected to be operated
on-board Space Shuttle Orbiters.
The intent of the present effort was to focus on inherent characteristics of
Experiment Equipment and its operations in order to identify safety
measures. As the level of definition of such equipment and its operation
increases, the Safety Guidelines presented herein can be expanded.
A number of recent studies for NASA, referenced in Section 4.4, also contain
guidelines which are applicable to experiment safety.
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7. SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AMU Astronaut Maneuvering Unit
E Experiment
EC/LS Environmental control and life support system
EE Experiment Equipment
EM Experiment Module, a spacecraft element containing or housing
principal experimental equipments and experimenters (when
involved). Can be a Pallet, an MSM, or a RAM in configuration.
FPE Functional program element; a grouping of experiment classes
of research activities within a particular discipline of research.
LBNPC Lower Body Negative Pressure Chamber; a medical research
equipment.
MSM A mission-support-module within which research is conducted
in a pressurized environment by man.
MWP Maneuverable Work Platform
Pallet A structure upon which experimental equipment is mounted.
RAM Research Application Module containing experimental equipment.
RTG Radioisotope thermal generator
SOAR Shuttle Orbital Applications and Requirements; a study conducted
by McDonnell Douglas for NASA.
Sortie A mission class encompassing the conduct of orbital research
with the Shuttle system.
sub-FPE Payload elements within a FPE grouping.
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